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Abstract The Middle East respiratory syndrome coro-
navirus (MERS-CoV) is a newly emerged infection in
humans affecting the Arabian Peninsula, Europe, and North
Africa. The source and persistence of the infection in
humans remains unknown. The aim of this paper was to
apply a risk analysis approach to the epidemiology of
MERS-CoV and to understand the source of ongoing
infections. The epidemiology of MERS-CoV was reviewed
and compared to SARS. Each observed feature of MERS-
CoV epidemiology was summarized and fitted to either an
epidemic or one of two sporadic scenarios (either animal or
deliberate release). As of May 2014, MERS-CoV has
infected over 681 people and killed a further 204 over 2
years. In contrast, there were 8,273 cases and 775 deaths
from SARS within 8 months. MERS-CoV has a more
sporadic pattern unlike the clear epidemic pattern seen with
SARS, and an unusual concentration of cases in the Middle
East, without epidemics in other countries to which it has
spread. SARS, with a higher reproductive number (R0),
was eliminated from humans within 8 months of emerging,
yet MERS-CoV, with a low R0 has persisted in humans
over a far more prolonged period. This is at odds with the
expected behavior of a virus with a low R0, which theo-
retically should not persist unless there are ongoing intro-
ductions of infection into humans, and poses the question
‘‘what is the source of continuing infections in humans?’’ A
hospital outbreak in Al Ahsa, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia
(KSA), had a classic epidemic pattern with some human-
to-human transmission. However, 3 different strains were
identified in that outbreak, an unexpected and unexplained
finding for what appears to be a single source outbreak.
Since this outbreak in April 2013, there has been a large
increase in new cases, mainly in KSA in April and May
2014, with no corresponding epidemics in other countries.
Yet MERS-CoV was present in KSA over several mass
gatherings (which predispose to epidemics), including the
Hajj pilgrimage, without an epidemic arising. Furthermore,
although the virus has been identified in bats and camels,
the mode of ongoing transmission to humans remains
uncertain. Although some cases appear to be transmitted
from human to human, and a few have animal or camel
exposure, many cases have no history of contact with either
animals or human cases. A high proportion of asymptom-
atic or otherwise undetected cases have been postulated as
an explanation for the unusual epidemiology, yet active
surveillance does not support this. When the observed data
were fitted to different disease patterns, the features of
MERS-CoV fit better with a sporadic pattern, with evi-
dence for either deliberate release or an animal source.
There are many discrepancies in the observed epidemiol-
ogy of MERS-CoV, which better fits a sporadic than an
epidemic pattern. Possible explanations of the unusual
features of the epidemiology include human-to-human
transmission with a large proportion of undetected cases; or
sporadic ongoing infections from a non-human source; or a
combination of both. Possible sources of ongoing sporadic
infection in humans include animals (camels appear the
most likely source), or deliberate release. The latter could
explain 3 strains being present in a single hospital out-
break. Genetic testing should be conducted to determine
whether the virus is evolving to be more transmissible.
Better ascertainment of mild or asymptomatic cases is also
needed. Finally, the discrepant epidemiology warrants
critical analysis of all possible explanations, and
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involvement of all stakeholders in biosecurity, and delib-
erate release must be seriously considered and at least
acknowledged as a possibility.
Keywords MERS-CoV  Emerging infectious disease 
Epidemiology  Bioterrorism
1 Background
Viruses have the capacity to evolve, to exchange genetic
material between strains that infect different species, and to
emerge into new threats to human health. The Middle East
Respiratory Syndrome Coronavirus (MERS-CoV) which
causes severe acute respiratory illness with high mortality
emerged in April 2012 in the Middle East and spread
mainly through travel to several countries including the
UK, Germany, France, Tunisia, Spain, Italy and the US
(World Health Organization 2013). Comparisons have
been made to SARS, a related coronavirus which displayed
a classic epidemic pattern 10 years earlier. In just 8 months,
SARS resulted in 8,273 cases and 775 deaths (World
Health Organization). MERS-CoV in contrast to the clear
epidemic pattern of SARS, has a different epidemiology,
continuing to cause at least 681 non-fatal human infections
and 204 deaths after two years, without a clear source
(World Health Organization 2013; Wallinga and Teunis
2004). Unlike SARS, which spawned satellite epidemics in
the countries to which it spread, the majority of cases of
MERS have remained in the Middle East, mainly the
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA), with no satellite epi-
demics or sustained human-to-human spread in other
regions of the world, despite a large upsurge in cases in
KSA in April and May 2014.
Control of emerging infectious diseases falls within the
scope of biosecurity, which is a multidisciplinary field
incorporating biomedical researchers, public health
experts, emergency services, military, law enforcement,
and risk analysts among others. This paper is intended for a
broad, multidisciplinary readership, particularly for those
in the non-health disciplines involved in biosecurity. The
paper aims to apply a risk analysis approach to publicly
available data on MERS, to shift the paradigms of thinking
about emerging infectious diseases, to determine whether
the current surveillance and response to MERS is asking
the right questions, to consider whether MERS might be a
category C bioterrorism agent, and to engage all relevant
sectors in the response.
Infectious diseases are mainly classified as either epi-
demic, sporadic, or endemic (Anderson and May 2008).
Epidemics are defined by a rapid rise in cases over time, not
by the total number of cases. A small epidemic is usually
termed an outbreak, and an epidemic which spreads
globally is termed a pandemic. Diseases which have been
present for long periods in a population but do not display a
rapid rise in incidence over a short-time period, such as
malaria, are classified as endemic, even with high case
numbers. Diseases which have low case numbers and occur
occasionally are classified as sporadic. MERS-CoV has
displayed mixed features of both an epidemic and sporadic
nature (World Health Organization 2013).
A classic epidemic curve is a normal distribution of
cases over time (bell curve), showing a small number of
first cases, a rapid rise in new cases over a short duration,
an epidemic peak, and then a decline in cases. This cor-
responds to known mathematically predictable features of
infectious diseases, which relate to human beings existing
in mutually exclusive states of being infected, immune or
susceptible to any infection (Anderson and May 2008). For
any infection, the rate of transition of people within a given
population from one state to another (e.g., susceptible to
infected) can be modeled, using known parameters of the
pathogen. At the beginning of an epidemic, there is a
critical threshold of susceptible (non-immune) people in
the population which gives rise to epidemic conditions, but
at the peak, enough people in the population have been
infected and are immune, thus stopping ongoing trans-
mission. This then causes a decline in cases, giving rise to
the tail end of an epidemic curve. Epidemics can be caused
by humans becoming infected from either a single point
source or by person-to-person transmission. A point source
epidemic (such as food poisoning from a single contami-
nated food source consumed by many people) typically
shows a unimodal epidemic curve which then dies down,
whereas an epidemic with person-to-person transmission
(such as influenza), may show a bimodal peak, representing
the second generation of cases. Even in this case, with
ongoing human-to-human transmission, eventually, when
enough people are infected and become immune, the epi-
demic will die down and cease, until a critical threshold of
susceptibility is again reached in the population, either
through waning immunity, births, or migration (Anderson
and May 2008).
SARS displayed all the features of an epidemic (and
then a pandemic), with occurrence over a very short period
of time, a rapid rise of cases from the time of onset of the
first case, and classic epidemic curves and satellite epi-
demics in most countries which it affected, and then a
decline in the epidemic (Wallinga and Teunis 2004). In the
context of the well understood behavior of infectious dis-
eases and the accepted science of epidemiology, the aim of
this paper was to review the epidemiology of MERS-CoV,
to compare it to SARS, and to explore all possible expla-
nations for the observed epidemiologic data by fitting
observed epidemiologic features to either epidemic or
sporadic scenarios.
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2 Methods
A literature search was conducted for all available data on
MERS-CoV, including MEDLINE, EMBASE, PubMed,
and gray literature reports such as from the World Health
Organization (WHO) and ProMED-mail, a rapid outbreak
communication site. Publicly available surveillance data
were used to compare total cases over total time for MERS-
CoV with a related coronavirus, SARS, and to compare the
epidemiologic pattern of each virus.
The key features of the epidemiology of MERS-CoV
were then analyzed in detail. Finally, a risk analysis
approach was taken to classify each feature of the observed
epidemiology of MERS-CoV as being consistent with
either an epidemic or a sporadic pattern. An epidemic
pattern would arise from sustained person-to-person
transmission of infection and a R0 greater than 1 (Ander-
son and May 2008). A sporadic pattern would arise from
some other (non-human) source of ongoing infection to
humans, with generally a low R0 (\1) which does not
facilitate sustained person-to-person transmission. For
completeness, possible non-human sources of ongoing
human infections are a zoonotic or deliberate release. No
judgement was made about whether deliberate release may
be an engineered virus or a naturally occurring virus, nor
was any judgment made about reasons or motives for such
a scenario. The available data and evidence were simply
assessed according to known epidemiologic principles of
disease transmission. The publicly available data and evi-
dence were categorized into discrete epidemiologic fea-
tures, and then, each feature was fitted to the pattern which
best explained it, either epidemic or sporadic. Given that a
clear zoonotic origin of MERS-CoV explaining all spo-
radic cases has not been established, and a mixed pattern
has been observed, two sporadic patterns were consid-
ered—a zoonotic source or deliberate release. H5N1 is a
classic example of a sporadic human infection from a
zoonotic source. In the case of H5N1 infections in humans,
the vast majority of cases have clear exposure to a plausible
zoonotic source known to host the same virus (Uyeki
2008). This has not been the case with MERS-CoV, which
justifies considering other sporadic sources such as delib-
erate release.
3 Results
Figure 1 compares SARS and MERS-CoV, showing the
number of total cases and a timeline of persistence in
human populations since onset of the first case. This
highlights the difference between SARS and MERS-CoV,
showing the short time frame within which SARS persisted
and was then eliminated in humans, and the large number
of cases. MERS-CoV, in contrast, has a relatively low
number of cases and has persisted for almost three times
the duration, and at the time of writing this, continues to
occur in humans.
3.1 Comparison of features of SARS and MERS-CoV
MERS-CoV first emerged in a hospital in Jordan in April
2012 (World Health Organization 2013), with later cases
and clusters in KSA, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates.
Travel from these regions resulted in four additional clus-
ters in Europe and North Africa, and more recently in the
USA (World Health Organization 2013), with limited local
transmission occurring in each site. Furthermore, several of
the busiest airports in the world are located in countries
where MERS-CoV has been transmitted, yet no epidemic
has occurred in other countries as it did with SARS, which
caused classic epidemics in almost all countries to which it
spread, thereby displaying a consistency in epidemiologic
pattern (Anderson and May 2008; Airports Council Inter-
national 2012).
The majority of MERS-CoV cases have been associ-
ated with hospital outbreaks in Jordan, KSA, UAE and
France. These clusters have been somewhat variable in
clinical features, with the first outbreak in Jordon notably
featuring renal failure, which does not feature as much in
other clusters. SARS was also predominantly a nosoco-
mial infection (Wallinga and Teunis 2004), but MERS-
CoV is unlike SARS. The median age of MERS-CoV is
51 years, and risk factors include male sex, immunosup-
pression, hospitalization and chronic disease (Centers for
Disease Control and Prevention 2012). In contrast, SARS
was characterized by younger age, more female cases and
less co-morbidity. The male predominance of MERS-CoV
may reflect a lower risk of exposure for Middle Eastern
women due to wearing of Hijab, which covers the nose
and mouth.
MERS-CoV did not display an epidemic peak in the first
12 months after emergence as did SARS (Wallinga and
Teunis 2004). Rather, there was a sporadic pattern with
persistence over a longer duration than expected for a
disease with low estimated infectiousness (see Fig. 1).
While there has been a large surge in cases in KSA in 2014,
the pattern is still suggestive of a sporadic rather than
epidemic source of ongoing infection in humans. The
incubation period is estimated to be around 5.5 days
(Cauchemez et al. 2014). The reproductive number, R0 is
estimated to lie between 0.6 and 1.3, which can be inter-
preted as MERS-CoV having low epidemic potential
(Cauchemez et al. 2013; 2014; Breban et al. 2013).
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3.2 Features of MERS-CoV
In April 2013, an outbreak of 26 cases of MERS-CoV
occurred in a hospital in Al Ahsa, KSA. This outbreak
shows a typical short-duration epidemic curve suggestive
of an infection with a R0 [ 1, and consistent with a person-
to-person nosocomial outbreak caused by a single strain
(Assiri et al. 2013). Curiously, phylogenetic analysis of the
patient samples showed at least three different genotypes
were present in this outbreak, and at least five of thirteen
infections could not be explained by person-to-person
transmission within the hospital (Cotten et al. 2013a). This
suggests the hospital outbreak was caused by multiple
independent introductions, along with some person-to-
person transmission (Cotten et al. 2013a). The heteroge-
nous transmission pattern in this outbreak is reminiscent of
SARS, but multiple introductions into single out-
breaks were not observed in nosocomial outbreaks of
SARS. Further, the source of multiple introductions is
unknown for MERS-CoV. It is possible that super-
spreading events may have a role in the epidemiology of
MERS-CoV, but this does not explain the different geno-
types present in the one outbreak. Figure 2 also shows that
after more than a year of sporadic, infrequent cases that
there has been a more sustained increase in cases since
May 2013, mainly due to increased cases in KSA, with
case numbers in other countries remaining low. Saudi
Arabia is bordered by other countries and is a travel hub,
yet this large increase in cases, at odds with the pattern
seen from March 2012 until April 2013, has not been seen
in other countries. If the large recent increase in cases in
KSA is due largely to person-to-person transmission, other
similar increases (satellite epidemics) would be expected in
other countries (as was seen with SARS, with epidemics in
each affected country), yet this consistency of global epi-
demiology has not been observed to date.
Travel and globalization make mass gatherings such as
the Hajj pilgrimage a high risk for the spread of infectious
diseases around the world. Another contradictory feature of
MERS-CoV is that despite evidence of person-to-person
transmission in some outbreaks such as Al Ahsa, no out-
breaks arose from the Umrah or Hajj pilgrimages in KSA
over two consecutive years, 2012 and 2013. More than four
million pilgrims attend the Hajj alone, which is recognised
as a risk for epidemics of infectious diseases (Memish and
Rabeeah 2012). Active surveillance of symptomatic pil-
grims in 2012 failed to detect MERS-CoV infections, and
no cases were reported in returning pilgrims that year
(Gautret et al. 2013). Furthermore, surveillance of Hajj
pilgrims returning to high-income countries did not detect
any cases in 2012 (World Health Organization 2013), nor
were any antibodies detected in a serologic survey of blood
donors and abattoir workers in KSA at the time (Aburizaiza
et al. 2013). Rates of MERS-CoV in family and health care
workers contacts are also low (Memish et al. 2014).
Additionally, no cases have been reported by pilgrims who
travelled to KSA to perform Umrah during July and August
in either 2012 or 2013. Two unconfirmed cases in returning
pilgrims to Spain and a case returning to India were
reported following the 2013 Hajj; however, it is not yet
know whether these cases acquired MERS-CoV during the
Hajj or elsewhere in the Middle East during their travels
(World Health Organization 2013). The absence of an
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of four mass gatherings in KSA in 2012 and 2013, how-
ever, supports the sporadic pattern and estimated R0 \ 1.
Modelling shows that the probability of no secondary cases
arising from the Hajj, if even one person with MERS was
present at the time, is very low (Gardner et al. 2014).
MERS-CoV has persisted in the human population for at
least three times as long as SARS, but with a lower R0,
which in itself is contradictory. If the R0 is low, supported
by current estimates and the lack of an epidemic arising
from mass gatherings, then where are the infections coming
from? The sources of ongoing transmission to humans can
only be either person-to-person transmission, or sporadic
transmission from a non-human source, or a combination
of both. A non-human source could be zoonotic or delib-
erate release. While there is evidence of some person-to-
person transmission (Assiri et al. 2013), this has not been
shown to be the main mode of transmission. A zoonotic
origin was identified for SARS, but spread was mainly
person-to-person (Joseph et al. 2013). In contrast, person-
to-person spread cannot readily explain the persistence of
MERS-CoV, but if animal exposure is the source, most
cases have no consistent or clear history of animal contact.
MERS-CoV has been identified in various bat species
(Ithete et al. 2013; Cotten et al. 2013b; Annan et al. 2013).
It has been identified in camels suggesting MERS-CoV or a
related virus previously infected various camel popula-
tions, as early as 2003 (Reusken et al. 2013a; Perera et al.
2013; Group TWM-CR 2013; Meyer et al. 2014). While
the MERS-CoV has been reportedly identified in camels of
MERS-CoV patients, the actual mode and sequence of
transmission remains unclear. Phylogenic analysis dates a
common ancestor for all available MERS-CoV sequenced
genomes to mid-2011 (Cotten et al. 2013b; Drosten et al.
2013), before the first confirmed case in Jordon. However,
a cluster of viral sequences from the eastern Arabian
Peninsula share a common ancestor estimated to be later in
2012, after the Jordan outbreak. It appears that MERS-CoV
has infected humans through multiple introductions over a
relatively short period of time, which resulted in limited
clusters of cases. This corresponds to the observed epide-
miology, although it is unknown how many introductions
to humans may have occurred (Cauchemez et al. 2013).
One theory of MERS-CoV transmission is that a large
number of asymptomatic or mild cases have gone unde-
tected, thereby skewing the apparent epidemiology. A
modelling study explains the epidemiology with substantial
undetected mild cases, estimating that 62 % of a total of
940 cases were undetected (Cauchemez et al. 2013).
Yet active screening and case finding efforts including
contact tracing have not identified a substantial proportion
of asymptomatic cases (Joseph et al. 2013). Only 5 out of
417 household and healthcare worker contacts became
infected with MERS-CoV in the KSA cluster (Assiri et al
2013), and similarly, a serological study conducted on
individuals from Jeddah and Makkah showed no evidence
of widespread exposure to MERS-CoV (Aburizaiza et al.
2013). The model (Cauchemez et al. 2013) can only be
fitted to the observed epidemiology of MERS-CoV if a
large proportion of undetected cases are assumed to be
true. Yet there is little evidence to support this. Further, if a
large numbers of cases have been undetected, many of
these would have arisen following mass gatherings such as
the Hajj pilgrimage, where many pilgrims from high-
income countries travel to and from KSA. While cases in
returning international pilgrims may go undetected in low-
income countries with poor health systems, the likelihood
of case detection is high in countries with advanced health
systems and surveillance capacity. The lack of large
numbers of cases in pilgrims returning to high-income
countries following the Hajj in 2012 and 2013 does not
support the hypothesis of a large proportion of undetected
cases.
A summary of the various epidemiologic features of
































































































































Fig. 2 Cases of MERS-CoV
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or one of two sporadic patterns are shown in Table 1. This
shows that the evidence supports a sporadic pattern, with
slightly more weight to deliberate release compared to an
animal source.
4 Discussion
There are still uncertainties and contradictions about the
epidemiology of MERS-CoV, which is clearly different to
SARS, fitting a more sporadic pattern even accounting for
the recent surge in cases. SARS, in contrast had a clear
epidemic pattern, including in countries to which it spread.
The analysis of the features of MERS-CoV suggests that the
source of ongoing sporadic infections could equally be due
to an animal source or to deliberate release. The finding of
MERS-CoV in camels does not rule out deliberate release,
as a virus which is trophic to a host will, when present in an
ecosystem, find that host. The WHO is investigating animal
sources of infection as well as the mode of transmission to
humans (Aburizaiza et al. 2013). Animal samples collected
from KSA are currently undergoing analysis in US labora-
tories to help and identify the underlying zoonotic source(s).
Additionally, the similarity between MERS-CoV and the
closest bat coronaviruses suggests animal surveillance in
South Africa and certain parts of Europe would also be
valuable (Cotten et al. 2013b). Person-to-person transmis-
sion as the main mode of spread could only be explained if
there is a large proportion of undetected mild or asymp-
tomatic cases. This possibility is not supported by
surveillance studies, but better screening methods could be
developed. Serology for the detection of specific MERS-
CoV antibodies has been recently developed and validated
with a limited number of specimens (Reusken et al. 2013b),
but still need to be validated for use in the Arabian Peninsula
and Jordan (Nicoll 2013).
The available data do not clearly fit a specific epide-
miologic pattern, so it is important to think of all possible
explanations, and not simply force the data into a known
paradigm such as SARS. The possibility of deliberate
release, which has not yet been discussed in the scientific
literature, must be included for completeness, as this could
explain the long persistence, the paradox of hospital out-
breaks and yet no outbreaks following major mass gath-
erings, the evidence of multiple introductions, and the
presence of multiple genotypes simultaneously in what
appears on the surface to be a single hospital outbreak in Al
Ahsa. This outbreak is the most puzzling to date because of
the presence of multiple different genotypes in the outbreak
within a very short time frame—this means that the
patients with MERS-CoV had simultaneous or contempo-
raneous sporadic exposures (which have yet to be identi-
fied), either inside or outside the hospital. The published
work to date has focused on selected parts of the epide-
miology which can be explained, but no one to date has
questioned this single unusual finding, and deliberate
release, which is certainly a possible explanation, has not
thus far been publicly debated.
It seems likely that MERS-CoV has persisted in human
populations despite a low R0 due to a combination of
Table 1 Supporting evidence of the epidemiologic pattern of MERS-CoV









Low case numbers for 12 months 4 4
Low estimates of R0 4 4
Long persistence despite low R0 4 4
Some person-to-person transmission documented 4 ? ?
Hospital outbreaks 4 ?a
No epidemics arising from mass gatherings 4 ?
Evidence of multiple introductions in a single outbreak 4
Several cases without an identified epidemiologic link to a human case of MERS-CoV 4 4
Several cases without an identified epidemiologic link to a zoonotic source ? 4
Several cases with no link to human OR zoonotic source 4
MERS-CoV identified in camels 4
Multiple genetic strains in a single hospital outbreak at Al Ahsa Hospital ?b 4
Active surveillance had not found evidence of a high proportion of undetected cases 4 4
a Deliberate release inside hospitals could explain this
b For this to be the explanation, simultaneous animal exposure would have to have occurred to animal hosts carrying different strains in the same
time frame to cause concurrent human infections from different sources
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sporadic transmission from a non-human source and some
human-to-human transmission. The epidemiology appears
to have changed somewhat from May 2013 onward, but
there is no explanation for this change, which is due largely
by an increase in KSA alone, nor evidence as yet that the
virus is becoming more transmissible. The continued
increase in cases in KSA in 2014, without satellite epi-
demics in other countries, and without consistent animal
contact in all cases is inexplicable. Good diagnostic sero-
logical methods, serological surveys, contact tracing and
other surveillance in affected areas are needed to quantify
asymptomatic or mild infection and to identify exposures to
other (non-human) sources of infection. The serological
tools recently developed (Reusken et al. 2013b) can aid in
large-scale contact studies. An epidemiological protocol to
assess MERS-CoV cases in the UK was proposed, and
related protocols to implement surveillance schemes among
healthcare personnel, contacts of known and probable cases
and the general population have been published by CON-
CISE (2013). These protocols will help quantify clinical
characteristics (e.g., incubation and infectious period) and
epidemiological characteristics (e.g., source, risk factors, R)
of MERS-CoV. Open access to surveillance and screening
data will assist in further understanding the disease (Palm
et al. 2012).
5 Conclusions
In conclusion, a careful review of the paradoxes and
inconsistencies in the epidemiology of MERS-CoV raises
deliberate release as a possible explanation. The discrepant,
varying epidemiology is consistent with deliberate release,
as such an act cannot easily simulate expected natural
patterns, and is likely to produce an inconsistent epidemi-
ologic picture. When a new infectious disease emerges,
bioterrorism, unless it is caused by an eradicated disease
such as smallpox, may not be easily recognized for what it
is unless we consider the possibility. A sporadic animal
source of ongoing infections in humans is also possible,
with most evidence supporting camels. However, the large
increase in cases in 2014 without a clear accompanying
history of camel contact in the majority of cases does not
support this explanation. Other zoonotic infections which
occur sporadically in humans such as H5N1 influenza show
a far more consistent and clear history of contact with
animals/birds. The virus may be emerging to be more
transmissible, but there is no evidence for a clearly epi-
demic pattern as yet.
Control efforts to date been structured around an
underlying assumption of a natural cause of this disease
and has followed a standard public health response
framework using knowledge of SARS as a guide (Perl et al.
2014). However, the epidemiologic features of MERS-Cov
are clearly very different to SARS. There is a pressing need
for inter-sectoral collaboration, for involvement of all
stakeholders in biosecurity, including law enforcement and
military, and for reflecting on the available data and
interpreting it objectively, instead of trying to force the
data into a paradigm created around the past SARS expe-
rience. While both are coronaviruses, their epidemiology is
very different, and control of MERS coronavirus can only
be achieved when we gain understanding of the observed
paradoxes.
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